What is Intelligence. Thinking Beyond
Published on Monday, August 1st, 2011 at 11:04 am and is filed under Interesting Stuff
The nature of intelligence. Cognitive Science
The possibility of a psychological explanation of intelligence depends on how we interpret the logical operations: whether we understand them as a reflection of the finished reality or as an expression of genuine activity. Avoid this alternative can, of course, only axioms: the actual operations of thought can be given a genetic interpretation (fully preserving the irreducible nature of their formal relationship) only if they are analyzed axiomatically. Logics acts as a geometer, deductive construct a space and psychology may be likened to the physics, which measures the space of the real world. In other words, a psychologist is studying how to set the actual balance of action and operation, while the logic analyzes the balance itself in its ideal form, that is how it should be standard in mind with the condition of its full implementation.
The interpretation of Russell. Let’s start with the theory of intelligence of Russell, in which the psychology is the subject to logistics. When we perceive a white rose, Russell says, we learn together two concepts – the concept of rose and white. This is due to the process similar to perception: we grasp directly, as if from the outside “universal”, corresponding to the perceived objects that “exist” and are felt regardless of the thinking subject. Well, what to do in this case with the false ideas? It’s the same idea, just like any other, and the properties of the falsehood and truth are attached to concepts as well as the properties of red and white roses to. With regard to the laws governing universals and regulating their relations, they are derived only from logic, and psychology can only bow before this preliminary knowledge, which is given to it in a completely finished form.
This is the hypothesis of Russell. It makes no sense to refer it to metaphysics or metapsychology on the grounds that it contradicts common sense experimenters, because common sense mathematicians adapts to it quite well, and psychology must be considered with the mathematicians. However, such a radical thesis makes you wonder. First of all, it eliminates the concept of operations, because if universals are taken outside, they are not to be constructed. In the expression “1 +1 = 2″ “+” sign does not mean nothing else but relations between the two unit-mi, also does not include any activity that generates the number “2″: how very clearly says Couture, the concept of operations on the merits is ”anthropomorphic.” Consequently, the theory of Russell of fortiori also sharply separates subjective factors of thought (the conviction, and so on.) from the factors of objective (necessity, probability, etc.). Finally, this thesis addresses the genetic point of view to emphasize the futility of unanalyzed child’s thinking, an English supporter of Russell once said that “the logician is interested in the true thoughts, while the psychologist finds pleasure to describe the false idea.”
However, we do not accidentally started this chapter with reference to the concept of Russell: it was done in order to directly show that the boundary line between the logistics knowledge, and psychology can not be violated with impunity logistics. For even if, as do supporters of axiomatic point of view, to recognize an operation devoid of values, it is already inherent in it himself, “anthropomorphism” turns her into psychic reality. In fact, the genetic operation is the action in the strict sense, rather than just stating or comprehension of the relationship. Adding one to one entity combines the pitch black units into a single unit, although he could leave them isolated. This action is being realized in thoughts, of course, it assumes the character sui generis, distinguishing it from any other action, it is reversible, after the subject has united two units, it can separate them and come back, to the starting point. But nevertheless it remains the action in the strict sense, very different from a simple reading of this attitude as “2> 1″.
Supporters of Russell’s object to this argument only with an extrapsychological argument: this action, in their view, is illusory, because “1 +1″ is united in the “2″ from time immemorial (or, as Carnap and von Wittgenstein said, because “1 +1 = 2 “- is nothing but a tautology, which is characteristic for such a language, what is the” logical syntax “, and does not relate to the real thought, the functioning of which is specifically empirical). In general, mathematical thinking is self-flattering, believing that it constructs or invents something, in fact it is limited by the fact that reveals different aspects of the world, seeing it as a complete and permanent (and add the supporters of the “Vienna Circle” as a tautological completely). But even if we reject the psychology of intelligence in law to do nature the logical-mathematical entities, the individual mind still could not show any passivity in relation to the ideas (or signs of a logical language), nor with respect to physical entities, and to assimilate them , it must reconstruct them through the psychological real operations.
We add that the statement of Russell and representatives of the “Vienna Circle” of independent existence logical mathematical entities from their parent operations from a purely logical point of view are no less arbitrary than a psychological point of view: in fact, these statements are constantly hampered by a radical challenge posed by the recognition of the reality of classes, relations and numbers – the difficulty of the antinomies of “the class of all classes” and the actual infinite numbers. From the operational point of view, on the contrary, the infinite nature is merely the expression of operations, capable of endless repetition.
Finally, the hypothesis of a direct apprehension of universals of thinking, existing independently of him, is even more himerical from the genetic point of view. We assume that false thoughts of an adult are similar in terms of its existence, to thoughts that are true. What about that case with the concepts that the child consistently designs in various stages of development? What about the “scheme” of preverbal practical intellect? Are they outside the subject? What about the scheme of intelligence of an animal? If you reserve a “perpetual existence” of true ideas alone, at what age starts their understanding? In general, if the stages of successive approximation simply show intelligence to master the same “ideas”, where is the proof that a normal adult or the logic of Russell’s school already is able to penetrate into these ideas and that the next generation will not surpass them endlessly in this comprehension?